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TRUST ISSUES: USING STATES’ PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINES TO ADVANCE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CLAIMS
ALICIA MUIR*

INTRODUCTION
Instances of environmental injustice are more evident now than
ever before.1 As people are calling for societal change and social equality,2
it is important to include environmental justice in the conversation. When
evaluating institutional sources of racism, the United States must evaluate how industrial development, environmental policies, and regulatory
actions disproportionally affect minorities and low-income populations.3
In 2018, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) conclusively
reported that “results at national, state, and county scales all indicate
that non-[w]hites tends to be burdened disproportionately to [w]hites.”4
Racial minorities account for more than half of people who live within
1.86 miles of a toxic waste facility.5 While only 2.3% of white children are
*
JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022; Managing Editor, Environmental
Law & Policy Review; BA Global Affairs, George Mason University, 2018, summa cum
laude. Thank you to John, Jennifer, Alexis, Anya, and my friends for their constant support.
Additional thanks to my supervisors at the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection for exposing me to this area of the law and to the ELPR board and staff for
their hard work on this Note, and the rest of Volume 46. In closing, I would like to dedicate
this Note to my father, John Muir, and my late grandfather, Robert Muir, as they together taught me the importance of service and inspired me to enter the practice of law.
1
See Alejandra Borunda, The Origins of Environmental Justice—And Why It’s Finally
Getting the Attention It Deserves, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.national
geographic.com/environment/article/environmental-justice-origins-why-finally-getting
-the-attention-it-deserves [https://perma.cc/HC6V-666W].
2
Id.
3
See generally Bravo et al., Racial Isolation and Exposure to Airborne Particulate Matter and
Ozone in Understudied US Populations: Environmental Justice Applications of Downscaled
Numerical Model Output, 92–93 ENV’T INT’L 247 (2016).
4
See Vann R. Newkirk II, Trump’s EPA Concludes Environmental Racism Is Real, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-trump-adminis
tration-finds-that-environmental-racism-is-real/554315/ [https://perma.cc/R2VA-G3VG]
(exploring a variety of pollutants including particulate matter, smog, oil smoke, ash, construction dust).
5
See Jasmine Bell, 5 Things to Know About Communities of Color and Environmental
Justice, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2016, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org
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exposed to lead poisoning, 11.2% of Black children are exposed.6 There
are many other statistics which demonstrate the disproportionate effects.
It is evident that a population’s proximity to polluting facilities and level
of exposure to particulate matter or other harmful pollutants directly
affects health.7
As a result of these injustices, the environmental justice movement was born.8 Environmental injustice is simply the idea that minority
populations are disproportionately subjugated to environmental harms.9
Historically, environmental decisions have been made to the detriment
of minority communities.10 Like other institutions in the United States,
the environmental regulation scheme, regardless of intent, has perpetuated the oppression of minorities.11 This disparity is more prevalent in
mainstream discussions today, resulting in focused topics under the
umbrella of the environmental justice movement—like environmental
racism.12 Environmental racism refers to the “form of systematic racism
whereby communities of colour are disproportionately burdened with
health hazards through policies and practices that force them to live in
proximity to sources of toxic waste such as sewage works, mines, landfills,
power stations, major roads and emitters or airborne particulate matter.”13
Similar to other manifestations of long-term, systematic oppression, environmental decisions directly impacted past generations and the impacts
of those past decisions continue to plague minority communities today.14
/issues/race/news/2016/04/25/136361/5-things-to-know-about-communities-of-color-and
-environmental-justice/ [https://perma.cc/W3BG-5PUZ].
6
Id.
7
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
8
See Borunda, supra note 1.
9
Brian Palmer, The History of Environmental Justice in Five Minutes, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (May 18, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/history-environmental-justice-five
-minutes [https://perma.cc/92S3-PCY2]. Those living in poverty often live in hazardous
environments, which can lead to a myriad of health issues like asthma, lead exposure,
and cancer. See Gabriela Dominguez-Cortinas et al., Assessment of Environmental Health
Children’s Population Living in Environmental Injustice Scenarios, 39 J. CMTY. HEALTH
1999, 1999–2000 (2012).
10
See Borunda, supra note 1; Palmer, supra note 9.
11
Palmer, supra note 9.
12
Peter Beech, What Is Environmental Racism and How Can We Fight It?, WORLD ECON.
F. (July 31, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/what-is-environmental-rac
ism-pollution-covid-systemic/ [https://perma.cc/YL73-B39K].
13
Id.
14
See Daniel Cusick, Past Racist “Redlining” Practices Increased Climate Burden on
Minority Neighborhoods, SCI. AM. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ar
ticle/past-racist-redlining-practices-increased-climate-burden-on-minority-neighborhoods/
[https://perma.cc/SMZ7-PX4V].
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The cycle of harm needs to come to an end and restorative measures
must be implemented. While these communities must carry the lifelong
effects laid upon them by decades of harmful developments, there is still
time to alleviate the burden.15 Decisions can be made now to course-correct
and place future generations in a better position than they find themselves
at the present.
While the environmental justice movement has experienced some
success, its goals have not been fully realized.16 Although this concept took
root in political culture in the 1990s,17 the existing methods used to bring
environmental justice claims, like the Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”)
and the Civil Rights Act, have proven to be rather unsuccessful.18 The fact
that these methods often fail to produce results leads to dire consequences
for minority communities.19 One is forced to question why the movement
has failed to produce desirable results. It is clear that one fatal flaw is
the significant burden plaintiffs bringing environmental justice claims
in court face when using the EPC or the Civil Rights Act.20 With that in
mind, it is evident that a new, outside-of-the-box approach needs to emerge
to successfully leverage environmental justice claims in an effort to achieve
greater equality and secure environmental justice for both present and
future generations. To begin, it is critical that the right to a clean and
healthy environment for current and future generations is recognized for
all, regardless of one’s race.
The primary purpose of this Note is to evaluate a new method one
could use to bring an environmental justice claim. This Note suggests that
the solution can be found within the reinvigorated public trust doctrine.21
Instead of pursuing environmental justice claims on the federal level,
15

See Borunda, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk II, The EPA’s Failure to Protect People from the Environment, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016
/09/epa-civil-rights-environmental-justice-report/502427/ [https://perma.cc/U8NQ-94EZ].
17
Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-justice-movement
[https://perma.cc/Q2BP-A3W5].
18
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
19
See, e.g., Brian Willis, New Study Shows Environmental Racism and Economic Injustice
in Health Burdens of Particulate Pollution in the U.S., SIERRA CLUB (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2019/08/new-study-shows-environmental-rac
ism-and-economic-injustice-health-burdens [https://perma.cc/7PXK-SANF] (discussing
new EPA report which found that particulate air matter disproportionately affects minorities and those of low income).
20
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
21
See discussion infra Part III.
16
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plaintiffs could utilize the sleeping giant that is states’ public trust doctrines.22 Pennsylvania courts, the pioneers of this new path, held that its
public trust should be evaluated using private trust law principles.23 By
interpreting state-created public trusts through the lens of private trust
concepts, citizens in a number of states are capable of bringing environmental justice claims, as beneficiaries, against the state, as trustee.24 Thus,
environmental justice claims could evolve into a sophisticated breach of
fiduciary duties claim.25 By raising environmental justice issues in state
courts via a breach of fiduciary duty claim, plaintiffs will be able to raise
socio-economic and racial issues and at the very least, force a greater evaluation process, without having to demonstrate an intent to discriminate.
In Part I, the origins and recent history of environmental justice
will be explored.26 This part will provide the reader with context and an
understanding of the motivations behind crafting a new approach to obtain
environmental justice. In Part II, the existing means of levying environmental justice claims, namely the Fourteenth Amendment’s EPC and the
Civil Rights Act, will be analyzed to demonstrate the weaknesses in the
existing approaches. Upon reading about the weaknesses of the leading
bases of environmental justice claims, it will become evident to the reader
that there is a need for a new path forward.27
After providing a background of the environmental justice28 and
the existing means to allege said injustices,29 the Note will shift towards
explaining the solution. In Part III, the public trust doctrine will be explained in detail.30 First, the modest beginnings of the public trust doctrine
will be discussed.31 Second, the evolution of the public trust doctrine in
states will be explored.32 Although the doctrine has expanded, states have
not done so uniformly.33 States have created a public trust in reliance on
constitutional provisions, common law, or a combination of both constitutional provisions and common law jurisprudence.34 After analyzing the
22

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Sections V.A–B.
24
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
25
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
26
See discussion infra Part I.
27
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
28
See discussion infra Part I.
29
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
30
See discussion infra Section III.A.
31
See discussion infra Sections III.A–B.
32
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
33
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
34
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
23
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different flavors of public trusts, it will become clear that the strongest
public trust doctrines are those which derive support from a combination
of both constitutional law and common law jurisprudence.35
In Part IV, a summary and analysis of the private trust law principles will be provided since environmental public trusts should be
interpreted using private trust law principles.36 By exploring how trusts
are created, the various fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries (prudence,
impartiality, and loyalty), standing, the mechanics of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim, and potential remedies, this proposal will materialize into a
workable environmental justice cause of action.37 In Part V, Pennsylvania
will be examined as the case exemplar.38 In an attempt to set forth a
model other states to follow, there will be a summary of key cases, the
modern public trust doctrine, and a practical application using the facts
of an environmental justice claim.39 At the end of this Note, it will be evident that the public trust doctrine provides an alternative path to achieve
environmental justice.
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Environmental justice aims to ensure that every American, regardless of race or socio-economic status, possesses equal rights to a clean
environment including land, air, and water.40 To achieve this, those
developing, implementing, and enforcing environmental regulations and
laws need to be mindful of the effects of a project or operation on all
inhabitants.41 It is undeniable that regulators and enforcement agencies
are often caught in between industry and local residents,42 but federal
and state agencies must protect the environment for everyone equally.43
While some utilize the term “environmental racism,” meaning “any policy,
35

See discussion infra Section III.C.
See discussion infra Part IV.
37
See discussion infra Sections IV.A–E.
38
See discussion infra Part V.
39
See discussion infra Sections V.A–C.
40
Barry E. Hill, Time for a New Age of Enlightenment for U.S. Environmental Law and
Policy: Where Do We Go from Here?, 49 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10362, 10384 (2019).
41
Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10681, 10683 (2000).
42
See, e.g., Will Kenton, Regulatory Capture, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp [https://perma.cc/HAA5-4JZK]; Bryan
Bowman, Captured: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Took Control of the EPA, GLOBE POST
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/02/01/epa-regulatory-capture/ [https://
perma.cc/2WA4-W389].
43
Kuehn, supra note 41, at 10684.
36
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practice or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether
intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race
or color,”44 this Note will adopt the term environmental justice as it theorizes under a larger lens—considering both race and socio-economic class.
In addition to the health effects that can result from unequal environmental protection,45 minority and low-income communities are harmed
in other ways including, but not limited to, “[n]oise, odors, blowing trash,
aesthetic concerns, increased traffic, termites, decreased property values
and uses, fires, accidents, psychological harm, and other nuisance[s].”46
The 1960s marked the beginning of a new era of environmental
activism as the public became more aware of increasing pollution and
environmental damage.47 It is also worth noting that the environmental
movement coincided with the Civil Rights Movement.48 This increased
awareness and scholarly discussion about the harm of pollution resulted
in a mass movement.49 Most of the environmental laws today were created
during the 1970s.50 Yet, environmental justice is a relatively newly accepted idea.
Environmental justice—as we know it today—arose out of a series
of legal claims alleging that low-income and minority communities were
being unequally and unfairly exposed to environmental hazards.51 In 1982,
a Black community fought against a waste landfill being placed in Warren
County, North Carolina;52 this is considered to be the birth of the environmental justice movement.53 These grassroots community movements
44

Id. at 10682 (explaining how scholars frame their studies of environmental justice
within categories of concerns like procedural justice, social justice, distributive justice,
and social justice).
45
Claire Gillespie, Environmental Racism Is a Health Issue—How Experts Are Addressing
It, HEALTH (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.health.com/mind-body/health-diversity-inclusion
/environmental-racism [https://perma.cc/CSL4-TZMH].
46
Kuehn, supra note 41, at 10687.
47
See Hill, supra note 40, at 10364.
48
See Camille Vincent, Dr. King, Civil Rights and Environmental Justice: Reflections from
the MLK National Historic Site in Atlanta, GA, STUDENT CONSERVATION ASS’N, https://
www.thesca.org/connect/blog/dr-king-civil-rights-and-environmental-justice#:~:text=King
%20recognized%20that%20social%20justice,that%20all%20life%20is%20interrelated
[https://perma.cc/Z37G-JRM5].
49
See Hill, supra note 40, at 10364 (stating that, in fact, the very first Earth Day on
April 22, 1970, was attended by over twenty million people).
50
Id.
51
Tom Stephens, An Overview of Environmental Justice, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 229, 229
(2003).
52
Id.
53
Id.

2022]

TRUST ISSUES: USING STATES’ PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

713

created a stir in the nation.54 Soon there was a national conference, the
First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in
1991, to discuss environmental justice.55 At the Summit, delegates created
seventeen principles of environmental justice, including demands for increased education, protection of health, a mandate for universal environmental rights, and a grant of remedies for damages.56 In 1994, President
Clinton issued an executive order to address the disproportionate environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations, using the
term environmental justice.57 In 1998, the EPA published the definition
for environmental justice.58 While there is not a universally accepted
definition of environmental justice, there are common principles.59 Due
to the complexity of environmental justice, some have proposed a categorization of issues including: “(1) distributive justice; (2) procedural justice;
(3) corrective justice; and (4) social justice.”60
II.

EXISTING WAYS PLAINTIFFS CAN BRING ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE CLAIMS

The two primary ways plaintiffs can bring environmental justice
claims are: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment’s EPC and (2) the Civil Rights
Act.61 There are some other avenues that have been created through
statute, like the National Environmental Policy Act.62 However, due to the
54

Skelton & Miller, supra note 17.
Principles of Environmental Justice, FIRST NAT’L PEOPLE OF COLOR ENV’T LEADERSHIP
SUMMIT (Apr. 6, 1996), http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html [https://perma.cc/WU2C
-YJLW].
56
Id.
57
See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 32 C.F.R. § 651.17 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994); Kuehn, supra note 41, at 10682.
58
The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the development and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment implies
that no population should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate
share of exposure to the negative effects of pollution due to lack of
political or economic strength.
Kuehn, supra note 41, at 10682–83.
59
Stephens, supra note 51, at 233.
60
Id.
61
Daniel V. Madrid, Can the Environmental Justice Movement Survive without Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act?, 14 VILL. ENV’T L.J. 123, 130–41 (2003).
62
See Environmental Justice and National Environmental Policy Act, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/environmental-justice-and-national-environmental-policy-act
[https://perma.cc/68F6-UKYW].
55
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constraints of this Note, this Section focus on the primary avenues through
which plaintiffs levy environmental justice claims. For both the EPC and
the Civil Rights Act, key cases alleging environmental injustice will be
analyzed to understand the elements to establish, and obstacles to success with, such claims.63
A.

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”)
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution expresses

that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.64
The EPC, with its anti-discriminatory purpose, would appear to be an
appropriate vehicle to bring environmental justice claims against government actors.65 Commonly, one alleging an EPC violation will bring suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.66 Via section 1983, a person can bring an
action against a municipality or state agency seeking damages and injunctive relief.67 When bringing these claims, one must comply with the
statute of limitations and possess standing, which requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate actual or imminent injury.68
Generally, when evaluating whether there is an EPC violation, the
court will utilize a rational basis standard of review.69 However, when
the government action relies on racial classifications, courts will evaluate
it under strict scrutiny as racial classifications are inherently suspect.70
The strict standard of review for such classifications makes it much more
difficult for the government to successfully defend the classifications,
63

See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
65
See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 3 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R.
Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).
66
Id. at 18.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 19.
69
Id. at 5.
70
Id. at 6.
64
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because to succeed, the government needs to demonstrate “that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”71
While the government is burdened through strict scrutiny review,
plaintiffs now face an evidentiary burden. Due to rules that emerged from
EPC cases, plaintiffs are required to demonstrate discriminatory intent.72
As laws today rarely discriminate explicitly on race, plaintiffs must show
that a law or policy—which is facially neutral—has discriminatory intent.73
In order to prove discriminatory intent, a plaintiff can demonstrate “proof
of disparate impact, discrimination in applying statutory criteria, shifts
in agency procedure, and statements evincing an intent to discriminate.”74 “Mere evidence of a disparate, or greater, impact on one class
than another” is insufficient to show an intent to discriminate.75 Meaning,
statistical evidence of disparities alone is insufficient.76 If the statistical
disparities can be explained on grounds other than race, then there cannot be a clear pattern of racial discrimination.77 Considering that plaintiffs
need to demonstrate such circumstances in order to prompt the court to
evaluate the government action using strict scrutiny, discriminatory intent is a high burden for plaintiffs.78 No plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating that a facially neutral law was discriminatory through the nature
of its enforcement since 1886.79
The requirement for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent
presents a true roadblock for environmental justice claims under the Civil
Rights Act. For example, in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management
Corp., plaintiffs brought an environmental justice claim using the EPC
and challenged the state’s approval of a specific waste landfill outside of
Houston.80 As described above, the plaintiffs needed to provide evidence
of racial discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny.81 To support their claim

71

GERRARD, supra note 65, at 6.
Id.
73
Id. at 7.
74
Id. at 13.
75
Id. at 7. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Metro. Housing Dev.
Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
76
GERRARD, supra note 65, at 9.
77
Id. at 11. See generally Metro. Housing Dev. Co., 558 F.2d 1283; East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
78
GERRARD, supra note 65, at 11 (explaining that if plaintiffs cannot prove discriminatory
intent, courts will evaluate the issue using rational basis standard, which makes it easier
for government to succeed).
79
Id. at 9 (referencing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
80
Id. at 10.
81
Id.
72
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that there was a history of racial discrimination, plaintiffs emphasized
the fact that sixty-eight percent of the solid waste sites were located in east
Houston, where sixty-two percent of the minority population resided.82
Despite these statistics, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to provide
evidence of discriminatory intent; the statistics were insufficient.83
While there are some limited instances where the EPC proved a
valid path to achieve environmental justice, it is the exception rather than
the rule.84 In fact, environmental justice suits on EPC grounds almost
always fail because plaintiffs struggle to identify racial animus behind
facially neutral government actions.85 Requiring plaintiffs to prove an
intent to discriminate is a heavy burden. This is especially the case regarding instances of environmental injustice, where the laws, policies, and
government actions are neutral on their face while disproportionately
harming minority and low-income populations.86
B.

Civil Rights Act

The Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964.87 The Civil Rights Act
made it illegal to discriminate against someone because of their race, sex,
religion, or national origin.88 In the 1990s, plaintiffs started to use Title
VI to bring environmental justice complaints against recipients of federal
funds and administrative agencies.89 The two most relevant provisions
of the Civil Rights Act to discuss in the environmental justice context are

82

Id.
Id.
84
GERRARD, supra note 65, at 13 (citing Miller v. City of Dallas, 2002 WL 230834 at *8
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (finding that the effect of the city’s practices coupled with its
“sordid history of . . . racially-segregative zoning and related polices . . . offers substantial
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,” but the case settled outside of court));
see also Nicholas C. Christiansen, Environmental Justice: Deciphering the Maze of a Private
Right of Action, 81 MISS. L.J. 843, 854 (2012).
85
Christiansen, supra note 84, at 852.
86
Sheila R. Foster, Environmental Justice and the Constitution, 35 ENV’T L. REP. 10347,
10348 (2009).
87
See A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States: Civil Rights Acts, GEORGETOWN
L. LIBR. (Jan. 27, 2021, 11:42 AM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=
4172702 [https://perma.cc/UTM7-NDVP].
88
Id.
89
See Albert Huang, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: A Critical Crossroads, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/pub
lications/trends/2011_12/march_april/environmental_justice_title_vi_civil_rights_act/
[https://perma.cc/H9N7-9BKG].
83

2022]

TRUST ISSUES: USING STATES’ PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

717

Section 601 and Section 602.90 However, plaintiffs alleging discrimination through the Civil Rights Act face similar roadblocks as plaintiffs
who attempted to use the EPC.91
Section 601 of Title VI states that, “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”92 Plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination to obtain relief
under Section 601.93 Since decisions causing environmental injustice are
more likely to display disparate impact rather than discriminatory intent, it is virtually impossible for plaintiffs to provide the smoking gun
courts require.94 Thus, Section 601 fails to provide environmental justice
plaintiffs a successful path to obtain a remedy for the harms they suffered
as a result of environmental injustice.95
The second method one could use to potentially bring an environmental justice claim within the Civil Rights Act is Section 602.96 Section
602 states that, “[e]ach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . .
is authorized to effectuate the provisions of section 601 . . . by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders.”97 While this framework offers promise for
environmental justice claims, the Supreme Court limited the viability of
this course in 2001.98 In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court held
that Section 602 does not include a private right of action through which
plaintiffs can bring disparate impact claims.99
These two issues have blocked environmental justice plaintiffs from
receiving and/or pursuing civil rights remedies.100 While there is a private
right of action in Section 601, plaintiffs must demonstrate intentional
90

See Title VI and Environmental Justice, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice
/title-vi-and-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/D4LH-MSB8] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
91
GERRARD, supra note 65, at 23.
92
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006).
93
Christiansen, supra note 84, at 871. See generally Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
94
GERRARD, supra note 65, at 23.
95
Wyatt G. Sassman, Environmental Justice as Civil Rights, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.
441, 451 (2015).
96
See Huang, supra note 89.
97
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1.
98
See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
99
See id. at 293; Christiansen, supra note 84, at 871.
100
Sassman, supra note 95, at 450–51.
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discrimination.101 Alternatively, plaintiffs could, in theory, just demonstrate disparate impact via Section 602,102 but there is no private right
of action through Section 602.103 Sandoval greatly changed the legal
landscape as it left civil rights lawyers, specifically environmental justice
advocates, without many tools to assist their clients.104 In addition to
eliminating options for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court bound the hands of
lower courts.105
Currently, if one cannot prove intentional discrimination, the best
course of action is to rely on federal and state directives instructing agencies to consider environmental justice when making decisions.106 While
scholars and legal experts attempt to resuscitate the Civil Rights Act of
1968 by altering the standards of judicial review or using other parts of
the Act, like Section 1983 or Title VIII,107 the trend of the Supreme Court
is to limit the expansiveness of the Civil Rights Act.108 Thus, environmental justice plaintiffs are in need of a new legal action through which to
bring their claims.
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE MODERN-DAY PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE PROVIDES A NEW MEANS OF BRINGING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLAIMS

Today, discrimination is less likely to take place overtly.109 Instead,
it is more common that laws appear neutral on their face and yet result
in environmental injustice.110 Because of the burden for plaintiffs to prove
an intent to discriminate when bringing environmental justice claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s EPC or the Civil Rights Act,111 it is
101

Id. at 453.
Id. at 452–53.
103
Id. at 452.
104
Id. at 453.
105
Id. at 455.
106
See MIKE EWALL, ENERGY JUST., LEGAL TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY VS.
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23 (2012), http://www.ejnet.org/ej/ejlaw.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V54V-JJM5].
107
See Sassman, supra note 95, at 455–59 (arguing for the use of Title VIII to bring
environmental justice claims). See generally Rachel Calvert, Reviving the Environmental
Justice Potential of Title VI through Heightened Judicial Review, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 868
(2019) (arguing for use of arbitrary and capricious standard when plaintiffs challenge
environmental decisions of agencies).
108
Sassman, supra note 95, at 452–53.
109
Christiansen, supra note 84, at 851; GERRARD, supra note 65, at 6.
110
Christiansen, supra note 84, at 851–52.
111
See supra notes 41–53, 57–72 and accompanying text.
102
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a worthwhile endeavor to explore alternative means of raising environmental justice claims.
After the environmental protection movement in the 1960s to the
1970s, many states codified their commitment to protect the environment
for its present and future generations through constitutional amendments.112 These constitutional amendments often include language indicative of a public trust.113 Other states have moved to protect the environment
and its natural resources by adopting the public trust doctrine through
common law measures,114 like court decisions.115 This Note will evaluate
states that put in place environmental protections and recognized and
adopted the public trust doctrine.116 In order to evaluate the viability of
using the public trust doctrine to advance environmental justice claims,
the public trust doctrine’s origin and modern resurgence will first be
explored.117 After exploring the public trust doctrine broadly, the various
renditions that exist throughout states will be analyzed to determine
where these environmental justice claims will have the highest likelihood
of success.118
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine is an ancient concept; its roots can be
traced back to Roman civil law.119 Its influence can be seen in the English
common law system as well.120 The common law system adopted the
public trust doctrine from the Romans to distinguish private property,
jus privatum, and property held in trust for the public, jus publicum.121
In the United States, the public trust doctrine began to manifest after the
Revolutionary War when leaders sought a way to protect the waterways
that would be used by all in commerce.122 However, the doctrine did not
officially enter the public consciousness until Illinois Central Railroad Co.
112

See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
114
See discussion infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.
115
See discussion infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.
116
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
117
See discussion infra Section III.A.
118
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3, III.C.
119
See George P. Smith & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural
Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006).
120
See James L. Huffman, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Brief (and True) History, 10 GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 15, 19 (2019).
121
Id.; Smith & Sweeney, supra note 119, at 311.
122
Smith & Sweeney, supra note 119, at 311–13.
113
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v. Illinois.123 In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court “placed an affirmative
duty on states to assist with protecting the people’s common law right to
access waterways” because states hold title to submerged waters in trust
for the inhabitants of the state.124 Historically, the public trust doctrine
was a means to protect commerce; it established legal means to preserve
the benefits of water resources, coastal waterways, and water-dependent
industries like fishing, for the public in the United States.125
The public trust doctrine has also been used as a mechanism to
protect environmental interests.126 As environmental concerns expanded,
so did the public trust doctrine.127 Scholars turned to the public trust
doctrine to serve as the tool to preserve the planet for future generations.128
Today, trusts are being proposed as a means to reach environmental goals,
including the conservation of resources,129 and as a means to fight climate change.130 It is evident that the public trust doctrine possesses the
ability to be a tool to solve resource management problems131 and, as this
Note argues, the looming problem of environmental injustice. In fact, an
expert on the public trust doctrine explained that the doctrine provides
a means to supplement or correct the actions of legislatures or administrative bodies.132 For this reason, Professor Joseph L. Sax stated that “the
public trust concept is, more than anything else, a medium for democratization.”133 The fight for environmental justice is indeed a democratic
123

Id. at 312–14.
Id. at 314.
125
Id. at 307–08.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 308.
128
See Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity,
11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 499 (1984). Preeminent scholar Mary Wood argues that nature
should be reframed as a trust as a means to ensure its protection against political pressures and self-interested decision-making. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 166–67 (2014).
129
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970).
130
See Kacie Couch, After Juliana: A Proposal for the Next Atmospheric Trust Litigation
Strategy, 45 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 219–26 (2020).
131
Sax, supra note 129, at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the
public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might
make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”).
132
Kylie Wha Kyung Wager, In Common Law We Trust: How Hawaii’s Public Trust
Doctrine Can Support Atmospheric Trust Litigation to Address Climate Change, 20 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 55, 76 (2014).
133
Id.
124
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movement;134 it aims to rectify the inequality in environmental regulations and prevent the unequal assignment of negative environmental
effects upon minority and low-income communities.135 As a doctrine that
calls for sound administration and equality,136 the public trust doctrine
aligns with the environmental justice movement.
The public trust doctrine is centered around the notion that
certain resources are “the inalienable property right of people.”137 These
resources belonging to the people are often held by a sovereign body for
the benefit of the people.138 While this sovereign power can be the U.S.
federal government, it is often the state governments who hold these
resources “‘in trust’ for the people.”139
B.

States as Public Trustees of the Environment

In response to the increasing awareness of environmental issues
in the 1970s,140 many states accepted the call to action and, like the federal government, enacted environmental protections.141 At least sixteen
states have some form of the public trust doctrine that is meant to protect
the environment.142 Many states have “explicit trustee provisions in their
constitutions related to natural resources.”143 While there are common
traits and principles, “each state has the authority and responsibility for
134

Learn About Environmental Justice, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn
-about-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/EC6Q-MBHY] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
135
Id.
136
Sax, supra note 129, at 475.
137
SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 18 (2001).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Seventies 1970–79, ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY, https://environmentalhistory.org/20th
-century/seventies-1970-79/ [https://perma.cc/S2QR-R23A] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
141
See Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1169, 1170 (1997); see, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow
of State Environmental Rights Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENV’T L. 431, 433–34 (2015). In
the 1970s, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act which codified the
public trust that previously existed in the common law. Id.; see also Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust
Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 835 (2010) (discussing how other states like Mississippi and
Tennessee adopted public trust principles through statutes).
142
Craig, supra note 141, at 850. These include but are not limited to: Alaska, California,
Washington, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Louisianna, Vermont, Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi,
North Dakota, South Carolina, and New Jersey. Id. at 829–50.
143
KEGAN A. BROWN & ANDREA M. HOGAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LAW AND
STRATEGY 221 (2d ed. 2019).
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applying the public trust doctrine to trust lands and waters.”144 For this
reason, the expansion of the public trust doctrine has not transpired uniformly amongst the states;145 some states have more robust public trust
doctrines that others.146 For example, some states with developed public
trust doctrines are still limited primarily to the context of water.147 Since
there is not one standard public trust doctrine, it is imperative to evaluate each state’s public trust doctrine.148 In this Section, states will be
divided into three categories based on the source and the expansiveness
of the public trust doctrine within the state.149 The first group includes
states that possess public trusts through constitutional amendments, but
have yet to fully utilize the doctrine.150 The second group includes states
that may have constitutional provisions, but have primarily relied upon
common law and courts to expand the public trust doctrine.151 The third
and final category includes states which have constitutional provisions
that established a public trust, but also where the doctrine was expanded,
through common law, to protect the environment and natural resources.152
The following analysis is conducted in an effort to evaluate the feasibility
of bringing an environmental justice claim through the public trust doctrine in various states.153
1.

Source—Constitutional Law

In many states, including Rhode Island, Louisiana, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, the public trust doctrine is embedded in the
state constitution.154 Having public trust language within a constitution
144

MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 12 (2d ed. 2015).
145
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
146
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
147
Craig, supra note 141, at 836–38 (“California maintains a connection between its
ecological public trust doctrine and a classic public trust doctrine principle: state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters.”).
148
BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 144, at 12.
149
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
150
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
151
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
152
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
153
See discussion infra Section III.C.
154
See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“[t]he natural resources of the state,
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people”); ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1; MASS.
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is impactful as it opens the door for increased environmental rights which,
in turn, can lead to increased environmental protection.155 It is important
to note that, unlike these states’ constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does
not have a provision concerning environmental rights.156 While it is beyond the scope of this Note, a popular movement within environmental law
is the call for green amendments.157 This movement—which can function
symbiotically with environmental justice and this Note’s proposal158—
aims to place environmental rights amendments in state and federal
constitutions.159 In sum, this movement is evidence of the power that
constitutional provisions possess.
This part of the Note aims to explore states with public trust
doctrines located within their constitution,160 like Rhode Island.161 Rhode
Island’s constitution in part states:
It shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for
the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal,
mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to
adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the
natural environment of the people of the state by providing
adequate resource planning for the control and regulation
of the use of the natural resources of the state and for the
CONST. art. XCVII; WIS. CONST. art. XI § 1; Jason J. Czarnezki, Environmentalism and
the Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2007).
155
See Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence
and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 846 (1990); Samuel L. Brown, Green
Amendments: A Fundamental Right to a Healthy Environment, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 30,
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/green-amendments-fundamental-right-to
-healthy-environment [https://perma.cc/76M2-SE4D].
156
Unlike other countries across the globe and some states within the United States, the
U.S. Federal Constitution lacks an environmental protection provision. See Luis Jose
Torres Asencio, Greening Constitutions: A Case for Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Rights to Environmental Protection, 52 REV. JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 277, 277 (2017).
157
Green Amendment, NAT’L CAUCUS OF ENV’T LEGISLATORS [hereinafter Green Amendment], https://www.ncelenviro.org/issues/green-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/J57X-SGXU]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
158
Green Amendments: Transforming Environmental Justice From Rhetoric to Reality,
GREEN AMENDMENTS FOR THE GENERATIONS, https://forthegenerations.org/wp-content
/uploads/Green-Amendment-Roots-of-Strength-for-Environmental-Justice.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6VJZ-PXQB] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
159
See generally GREEN AMENDMENT FOR THE GENERATIONS, https://forthegenerations.org/
[https://perma.cc/8NS2-94B6] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
160
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
161
See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural
environment of the state.162
While the constitutional provision appears powerful, Rhode Island’s codification of the public trust doctrine has not led to groundbreaking results.163
In evaluating this provision, courts have held that while the constitutional amendment did create a public trust, the doctrine extends only to
navigable waters and shorelines.164 While Rhode Island possesses the
ingredients for a strong public trust doctrine, at this time, the doctrine
remains confined to its traditional form.
Another state worth noting is Illinois. Its environmental provision
places a duty upon the state and all people “to provide and maintain a
healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations.”165
However, the provision hinges on public health rather than general environmental harm.166 Yet, it does grant individuals environmental rights
upon which they can bring suit to enforce.167 While it has yet to be interpreted too broadly, Illinois has the foundation to expand the doctrine.168
Like the other state constitutions within this Section,169 Massachusetts’s constitution grants individuals environmental rights.170 Article
XCVII of the Massachusetts Constitution states:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water,
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment, and the protection of the people in their right
to the conservation, development, and utilization of the
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air, and other natural

162

Id.; see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16 (articulating that state regulatory authority to
protect public trust uses is a legitimate use of the police power).
163
Craig, supra note 141, at 831.
164
See, e.g., State ex rel. Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 606–07 (R.I. 2005)
(denying the argument that a rule regulating swimming violates the public trust doctrine); Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999) (holding
that the public trust doctrine entitles citizens to water resources).
165
See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
166
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 717 (2006).
167
Id.
168
Kacy Manahan, The Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, 49 ENV’T L. 263, 299–300
(2019).
169
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
170
See MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
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resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose. The
general court shall have the power to enact legislation
necessary or expedient to protect such rights.171
Essentially, it provides that individuals have a right to a healthy environment and that the state should manage and conserve the environment.172
In interpreting this provision, courts have limited the applicability of
Article XCVII by holding that the resources are not regulated by classic
trust principles.173 However, courts have not evaluated the scope and
application of the grant of environmental rights in Article XCVII.174
While Rhode Island, Illinois,175 and Massachusetts all have constitutional provisions indicative of a public trust,176 they are not identical.177 Thus, it is important to evaluate the differences to understand
what could lead a court to evaluate the provision as a strong public trust.
One difference between these states is where the public trust language
is placed within the constitution. Rhode Island is one of the few states to
place its environmental rights amendment in the same part as political
rights.178 It is significant to have the public trust in the political rights
part of a constitution because it either implies or explicitly asserts that
inhabitants possess environmental rights.179 Alternatively, Louisiana’s
environmental trust is located within Article IX, Natural Resources, instead of Article I, Declaration of Rights.180 Illinois’s public trust language
is in Article XI of its constitution, the article focused on the environment,
rather than Article I, which is the bill of rights.181
While there is room to develop the public trust doctrine in any state
by amending the state constitution,182 the best venues for environmental
171

Id.
Id.; Manahan, supra note 168, at 302.
173
Manahan, supra note 168, at 302–03 (“the state may dispose of this property by a
simple vote, rather than pursuant to trust principles.”).
174
Id. at 305.
175
For further discussion of the public trust doctrine in Illinois, see Craig, supra note 141,
at 834–45.
176
See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1; MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
177
See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text.
178
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 962 (Pa. 2013). Only Pennsylvania,
Montana and Rhode Island placed their environmental rights on equal footing as other
political rights within their state constitutions.
179
Id.
180
LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
181
See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1; contra ILL. CONST. art. I.
182
Green Amendment, supra note 157.
172
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justice claims are states which currently possess an established constitutional provision.183 After reviewing states where there is a constitutional
provision creating a public trust, it is clear that while a constitutional
provision may be helpful in providing a legal cause of action, it alone may
be insufficient.184
2.

Source—Common Law

The public trust doctrine is a creature of the common law.185
Therefore, it is not surprising that some states’ public trust doctrines
developed through common law—including California, Vermont, North
Dakota, and South Carolina.186 The key feature of these states is that the
public trust doctrine has been expanded primarily through the courts.187
Another common feature is that the public trust doctrines in these states
are generally restricted to water resources instead of protecting all
natural resources.188
California is a great example of this model. Although California
has no public trust language within its state constitution, it is considered
to have one of the most robust public trust doctrines in the United States.189
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (“Mono
Lake Case”), the California Supreme Court held that the public trust
doctrine applied to all navigable lakes and streams and non-navigable
tributaries, not just tidelands.190 Through this holding, California expanded the public trust doctrine to protect all recreational and ecological
values instead of simply protecting traditional uses of water like navigation, commerce, and fishing.191 The court instructed the state to consider
ecological and aesthetic interests in its decision-making processes.192
183

Jeremy Cox, Push Is on for ‘Green Amendments’ in Four Bay State Constitutions, BAY
J. (July 14, 2021), https://www.bayjournal.com/news/policy/push-is-on-for-green-amend
ments-in-four-bay-state-constitutions/article_6bea6c4e-de78-11eb-a03e-37aac2b667b0
.html [https://perma.cc/7LJT-F8N8].
184
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
185
See Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law Shaping
Environmental Policy?, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 73, 73 (2003).
186
See discussion infra Section III.B.2. For a discussion of North Dakota’s and South
Carolina’s court expansion of the public trust doctrine, see Craig, supra note 141, at 841–43.
187
See infra notes 190–93, 196–97, and accompanying text.
188
See infra notes 190–93, 196–97, and accompanying text.
189
Wager, supra note 132, at 77.
190
Id. at 77.
191
Id.
192
Klass, supra note 166, at 710–11.
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While this was a huge expansion, the public trust doctrine is still limited
to the confines of water.193
Another example of a state whose public trust doctrine primarily
rests in common law is Vermont. Vermont’s constitution possesses trust
language that protects hunting and fishing.194 In evaluating Chapter II,
Section 67, the Vermont Supreme Court initially adopted a limited interpretation of the public trust because the provision lists out specific
things to conserve.195 However, in a later case, the court favored a more
expansive interpretation, remarking on the doctrine’s ability to “be molded
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was
created to benefit.”196 Thus, the courts strengthened Vermont’s public
trust doctrine, as their decisions have expanded its application and
provided citizens with a cause of action.197
The biggest issue with states whose public trust falls within the
common law category is that the trust does not protect the environment
generally.198 Since it is still tied to the common law interpretation, which
is limited to water,199 these states may be less hospitable venues to advance environmental justice claims using the public trust doctrine. Thus,
it is necessary to explore states in which the public trust protects the
environment and a variety of natural resources.200
3.

Source—Combination of Constitutional and Common Law

In some states, there is both public trust language within constitutional provisions and case law that has reaffirmed and expanded the
doctrine.201 Examples of states whose public trust doctrine derives from
193

Huffman, supra note 120, at 28.
See VT. CONST. ch. II § 67 (“The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, on other lands not enclosed, and in
like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper
regulations to be made and provided by the General Assembly.”).
195
Craig, supra note 141, at 833–34.
196
Id. at 850.
197
Id. at 834 (citing State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989)).
198
See Craig, supra note 141, at 841 (“North Dakota has considered the role of the public
trust doctrine with regard to more general ecological considerations, but has nevertheless
continued to confine the doctrine’s application to water resources.”).
199
See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 120, at 28 (discussing the limitation of California’s
public trust doctrine).
200
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
201
Lum, supra note 185, at 73–74.
194
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its constitution and common law include Pennsylvania,202 Hawaii,203
Montana,204 Alaska,205 and New York.206 Pennsylvania is a unique and vital
case study, and it will be discussed at length later in this Note.207 For that
reason, this Section will focus on Hawaii and Montana.
Hawaii is recognized as having an expansive interpretation of the
public trust doctrine.208 Hawaii’s constitution explicitly created a public
trust by stating that:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and
protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources,
including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources,
and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation
and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.209
Hawaii’s public trust doctrine is also extremely rooted in common law as a
result of historical practices.210 Hawaiian courts interpret the constitutional
language broadly.211 The Supreme Court of Hawaii clarified that its state
constitution created an enforceable public trust that can limit the legislature’s ability to act.212 Furthermore, the court adopted a broad interpretation of natural resources to include groundwater.213 While Hawaii’s
jurisprudence focuses on water, its public trust is broader than California’s
202

PA CONST. art. I, § 27; Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957 (Pa. 2013).
HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 8; Wager, supra note 132, at 77.
204
See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 3. See generally Gregory S.
Munro, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Montana Constitution as Legal Bases for
Climate Change Litigation in Montana, 73 MONT. L. REV. 123 (2012).
205
See ALASKA CONST. Art. VIII §§ 1–4, 17; see also Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Alaskan
Wolf War: The Public Trust Doctrine Missing in Action, 15 ANIMAL L. 193, 197–200 (2009).
206
Lum, supra note 185, at 73 (remarking on the expansion of the public trust doctrine
in New York); Steven C. Russo, Beware of the Public Trust: New York’s Highest Court
Stops Retail Expansion on Citi Field’s Parking Lot Under Public Trust Doctrine, GREENBERG
TRAURIG (June 14, 2017), https://www.gtlaw-environmentalandenergy.com/2017/06/arti
cles/state-local/new-york/beware-the-public-trust-new-yorks-highest-court-stops-retail-ex
pansion-on-citi-fields-parking-lot-under-public-trust-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/ZBW3-CTNJ].
207
See discussion infra Part V.
208
Wager, supra note 132, at 77.
209
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
210
Craig, supra note 141, at 839.
211
Id. at 839–41.
212
Manahan, supra note 168, at 271.
213
Wager, supra note 132, at 77.
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public trust because of the scope of its constitutional provision.214 Article
XI is interpreted to include environmental and biodiversity protections.215
Importantly, the public trust has been interpreted as placing “an affirmative duty [on both the legislative and executive branches] to consider the
public trust uses in the planning and allocation of water resources and . . .
protect them where feasible.”216 In these necessary considerations, the
rights through the public trusts are given greater importance than private economic interests.217
Like Hawaii, Montana is a state that possesses a public trust
doctrine that expanded as a result of both constitutional and common law.
Montana amended its constitution to give its inhabitants environmental
rights, stating that “[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations.”218 Montana is progressive, as its constitutional language grants its citizens the constitutional right to a clean and healthy
environment.219 In Montana, the public trust doctrine functions as a check
on government actions because the degradation of natural resources can
be deemed unconstitutional.220 This anti-degradation claim could survive
even if there is not a conclusive link to negative health effects.221 However, Montana’s public trust doctrine does not give individual citizens a
remedy; instead it serves as a check on legislative and agency action by
requiring greater review.222
As evident through both Hawaii and Montana, states that have a
more established public trust doctrine will be more hospitable to plaintiffs bringing environmental justice claims in the future.223 After exploring
the different variations of the public trust doctrine, it is clear that some
iterations of the public trust doctrine are much more progressive and
expansive than others. Thus, it is critically important for environmental

214

Craig, supra note 141, at 840–41.
Id. at 841.
216
Manahan, supra note 168, at 272–75 (while the state is entitled to some deference,
decisions are evaluated using a “close look.”).
217
Id. at 272.
218
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; Klass, supra note 141, at 440.
219
Jack Tuholske, The Legislature Shall Make No Law . . . Abridging Montanans’ Constitutional Rights to a Clean and Healthful Environment, 15 SE. ENV’T L.J. 311, 312 (2007).
220
See Montana Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999).
221
Id.
222
Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 481 P.3d 198, 217–19
(Mont. 2021).
223
See discussion supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text.
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justice plaintiffs and their attorneys to evaluate the history of the public
trust doctrine, its modern application, and its limits within a specific
state to determine whether an environmental justice claim would likely
be successful.
C.

Reflection About States’ Public Trust Doctrines

Multiple scholars point to the public trust language within state
constitutions as an area situated for continued growth and a means to
check government actions.224 Even though the public trust doctrine exists
in some form in many states,225 some have yet to expand the application
of the doctrine beyond navigable waters and submerged land to natural
resources and the environment in general.226 Yet, there are a lot of states
with viable constitutional provisions through which courts could reinvigorate the doctrine.227 Furthermore, even courts that interpreted the
doctrine narrowly in the past admit that the doctrine has much more
flexibility and purpose than they previously expected.228
A state that codifies the public trust doctrine, grants their citizens
environmental rights, and expands the doctrine through case law to
protect more than water resources would be the best venue for plaintiffs
to bring an environmental justice claim. Not every state discussed in this
Note is currently a hospitable venue for an environmental justice plaintiff to bring a claim using the public trust doctrine.229 However, states
can expand their public trust doctrines by amending their constitutions,
and individuals and organizations can propel the development forward
through strategic litigation.230 Through both constitutional reform efforts
and purposeful litigation, more states can become amenable venues for
224

See Manahan, supra note 168, at 284; Lum, supra note 185, at 73 (noting the influx
of legal research on the public trust doctrine).
225
See generally Craig, supra note 141 (discussing the public trust doctrine in the following
states: Alaska, California, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Louisiana, Oregon, Washington,
Vermont, Illinois, Mississippi, Tennessee, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas,
South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and New Jersey).
226
See Manahan, supra note 168, at 292–96 (noting how both Virginia and North Carolina
have the broad foundation for the public trust doctrine, but courts have yet to hold that
such language is self-executing or that it provides a cause of action to citizens); Klass,
supra note 141, at 439.
227
See supra Sections III.B.1–3.
228
See generally supra Sections III.B.1–2.
229
See discussion supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text.
230
See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957
(Pa. 2013).
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environmental justice claims based on the public trust doctrine and the
state’s fiduciary duties. Thus, this Note’s proposed method of bringing
environmental justice claims is immediately useful in some states and
could become more pertinent as states evolve their public trusts over time.
To analyze and describe the way environmental justice plaintiffs
could bring legal claims using the public trust doctrine, this Note will
utilize Pennsylvania as a case study.231 Pennsylvania is one of the states
where an environmental justice claim through the public trust doctrine
could succeed today.232 Pennsylvania interprets its public trust broadly,
using private trust law, and provides citizens an actionable right to bring
suit under the doctrine.233
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES CAN UTILIZE TRUST
LAW AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO CHALLENGE A
STATE’S ACTIONS

The public trusts, created through constitutional amendments
and case law, create a trust.234 Public trusts are judicially enforceable.235
These public trusts bear significant differences from charitable trusts,236
and thus should be evaluated using private trust law doctrines.237 The res
or corpus is the environment and natural resources within a state.238 The
beneficiaries are living residents of the state and, depending on the public
trust, future generations.239 The trustee is the state, which would include
all branches of government and administrative agencies.240 As trustee,
231

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part V.
233
See discussion infra Part V.
234
Manahan, supra note 168, at 263.
235
Id. at 268.
236
While a charitable trust may appear to have similarities to trusts created by the public
trust doctrine, the public trusts are not necessarily created for a charitable purpose—
rather they recognize rights of individuals concerning the environment. For more
information on charitable trusts, see Jessica Smith, Charitable Trusts and the Cy Pres
Doctrine: Overview, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article
/charitable-trusts-and-cy-pres-doctrine-overview [https://perma.cc/68VA-77SR].
237
There is already case law supporting the use of private trust law to interpret public
trusts. See Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 911 (Pa. 2017) (holding
that Art. I, Section 27 created an environmental trust and that Pennsylvania trust law
should be the used to understand it).
238
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
239
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
240
See id.; Manahan, supra note 168, at 264.
232
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the state must adhere to the duties of a trustee, including prudence, impartiality, and loyalty.241 The trustee can be sued by the beneficiaries for
breaching these duties.242
The public trust doctrine exists in several states and provides a
new path for environmental justice plaintiffs to obtain relief without having to demonstrate discriminatory intent. To illustrate the viability of
such a suggestion, this Section will explore how trusts are created,243 the
duties of trustees,244 and the rights of beneficiaries.245 Then, the mechanics of the claim will be evaluated through a discussion of standing,246 the
elements of breach of a fiduciary duty,247 and the remedies available.248
A.

The Existence of a Trust

To create a trust, there must be an intent to create a trust.249
There are three key components of a trust: the res, a beneficiary, and the
trustee.250 “Almost all the relevant uses of the word trust are associated
with a fiduciary relationship—that is, when one person holds and manages property or acts on behalf of another.”251 A trustee is one who “holds
and manages property, under exacting rules, for the exclusive benefit of
another.”252 There are a variety of duties that arise from the creation of
a trust including the duty of prudence, the duty of loyalty, and the duty
of impartiality.253 Beneficiaries can bring claims against their trustees to
ensure adherence to their duties.254
241

See discussion infra Section IV.B.
See discussion infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
243
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
244
See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1–3.
245
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
246
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
247
See discussion infra Section IV.E.
248
See discussion infra Section IV.E.
249
FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 137, at 27.
250
Id. at 25.
251
Id. at 18.
252
Id. at 25.
253
See CHARLES E. ROUNDS JR. & ERIC P. HAYES, LORING: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK 109,
§ 6.1 (1998) (“A trust relationship brings with it five fundamental duties: 1. the duty to
be generally prudent; 2. the duty to carry out the terms of the trust; 3. the duty to be
loyal to the trust; 4. the duty to give personal attention to the affairs of the trust; 5. the
duty to account to the beneficiary.”).
254
FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 137, at 31 (“[T]rustees’ duties are obligations that are
legally enforceable. The basic format is that the beneficiary is entitled to sue a trustee
in order to enforce the principle of undivided loyalty or any other obligation of the trustee.”).
242
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In evaluating an environmental justice breach of fiduciary duties
claim, a court will first have to identify if there is a public trust.255 Plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that there was an intent to create a trust,256
and then evaluate the trust using traditional labels of trust law like res,
trustee, and beneficiary.257
Applying private trust terms to a public trust would likely result
in the following. The res, the property of the trust, would likely be the
environment and the natural resources of the state.258 This is because the
state constitution provisions include such language.259 The state would
hold the “res” in trust for the public and generations to come.260 It is
likely that the “state” would include the judicial, executive, and legislative branches as well as the entities which the legislative branch grants
power to.261 Therefore, the state is akin to the trustee and the public and
future generations are like the beneficiaries.
Proving the creation of a trust will place an additional burden on
environmental plaintiffs who first utilize this type of claim. However,
environmental justice plaintiffs can meet this burden. “The foundational
principle for the public trust doctrine rests on the premise that the
government serves as the steward for the land and natural resources of
our nation, acting as trustee for the benefit of the public.”262 The plaintiffs can turn to the legislative history and the constitutional provisions
of the state to show that the legislators manifested an intent to give the
benefits of the environment to the people. Furthermore, once state courts
find that a public trust protecting the environment and natural resources
was created, future plaintiffs will not have to litigate over its existence.
Once the environmental justice plaintiffs demonstrate that the
public trust is a trust under private trust law principles, a new means of
bringing environmental justice claims will be available. If environmental
resources and recreation are protected through the public trust for all the
inhabitants of the state, the state and its agencies would have a duty to
255

BROWNE C. LEWIS, Chapter 2—Creation of Private Trust, in LAW OF TRUSTS (2013),
available at http://lewislawoftrusts.lawbooks.cali.org/chapter/creation-of-a-private-trust/
[https://perma.cc/C2AR-KYPM].
256
Id. § 2.1.
257
Id. § 2.2.
258
WOOD, supra note 128, at 143; see, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. X (“All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.”).
259
See discussion infra Sections IV.A, C.
260
BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 144, at 12.
261
Manahan, supra note 168, at 265; BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 144, at 12.
262
BROWN & HOGAN, supra note 143, at 221.
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preserve the resources for future generations.263 Furthermore, the state
and its agencies must properly administer the trust by complying with
their duties as trustee, including prudence, impartiality, and loyalty.264
“Under these concepts of fiduciary duty, trustees are not only obligated to
react to contaminating events, they may also be obligated to take affirmative action when necessary to protect natural resources for the benefit
of future generations.”265 If the environment must protected for all current and future inhabitants, the state must protect the environment
equally for all beneficiaries.266 Thus, decisions that disproportionately
impact minorities or those of lower socio-economic status could constitute
a violation of such duties. With the existence of a public trust and through
an evaluation of the public trust through private trust principles, citizens
would be empowered to make certain that the state is regulating the
environment—the trust—pursuant to its duties as trustee. This means,
environmental justice plaintiffs in states with a robust public trust doctrine could sue the state for violating its duties as trustee and achieve a
remedy for environmental injustice.
B.

Fiduciary Duties of Trustees

To understand this cause of action for environmental justice
plaintiffs, it is important to first discuss the fiduciary duties of a trustee.
Private trust law places a variety of duties upon trustees.267 When a trust
is created, trustees receive a great amount of power and discretion to
manage the res of the trust.268 Per the common axiom, “with great power
comes great responsibility,” trustees are held to a high standard through
a variety of fiduciary duties.269 Fiduciary duties limit the power of the
263

See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d at 957 (noting that “[a]s trustee,
the Commonwealth has a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation,
diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, whether such degradation, diminution, or depletion would occur through direct state action or indirectly.”).
264
BROWN & HOGAN, supra note 143, at 222 (“Because the public trust doctrine relies on
the fundamental concepts of property held in trust for the benefit of others, trustees owe
fiduciary responsibilities to the public beneficiaries, such as duties of good faith and
loyalty, as well as duties to avoid waste and maximize value.”).
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 144, at 7–8.
268
Sidney Kess & Edward Mendlowitz, Understanding the Duties of a Trustee in Administering a Trust, CPA J. (June 2019), https://www.cpajournal.com/2019/06/03/under
standing-the-duties-of-a-trustee-in-administering-a-trust/ [https://perma.cc/69QC-SC48].
269
SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). See also BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 144, at 7–8.
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trustee by providing clear duties and responsibilities.270 The duties provide beneficiaries with the capability to monitor the trustee and challenge
the trustee’s actions if they think a duty was violated. For environmental
justice litigation, a trustee’s fiduciary obligations would give citizens the
power “to protect their public property rights.”271 Often, in disputes between a trustee and a beneficiary, the court will place a burden on the
trustee; there is a “rebuttable presumption of fraud or undue influence.”272
Generally, courts evaluate a trust strictly against the trustee and in favor
of beneficiaries.273 In an effort to understand the fiduciary duties of trustees that a claimant can propose the state has violated in an environmental justice claim, a discussion of the duty of prudence, impartiality, and
loyalty will follow.274
1.

Duty of Prudence

The primary purpose of a trustee is to preserve the res of the trust;
the duty of prudence is the duty that corresponds to this essential purpose.275 It is sometimes referred to as the duty to protect or the duty to
care.276 This means that the state must manage the trust in such a manner
that future generations of beneficiaries may benefit as well. In managing
and maintaining the trust, a trustee must exercise ordinary skill and
care.277 When evaluating compliance, the courts use an objective standard
of care.278 This duty is often explicitly named in constitutional provisions
270

See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1145, 1146 (2014).
271
WOOD, supra note 128, at 167.
272
FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 137, at 29.
273
Id. at 31.
274
See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1–3. While there are other duties that bind trustees,
like the duty to account and inform, they are not reviewed in depth within this Note
because the duty is somewhat duplicative of states’ versions of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), like the right to know laws in Pennsylvania and other states. See,
e.g., OFFICE OF OPEN RECORDS, RIGHT TO KNOW LAW CITIZENS’ GUIDE (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/RTKL/CitizensGuide.cfm [https://perma.cc/4F8B-PRQG].
275
WOOD, supra note 128, at 167.
276
Id.
277
See UNIF. TR. CODE § 804 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000).
278
See Trustee Duties and Liabilities, JUSTIA [hereinafter Trustee Duties and Liabilities],
https://www.justia.com/estate-planning/trusts/trustee-duties-and-liabilities/#:~:text=
The%20duty%20of%20prudence%20requires,in%20managing%20the%20trust%20pro
perty.&text=Under%20common%20law%2C%20the%20trustee,be%20required%20to%
20personally%20perform [https://perma.cc/G24N-CTNN] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
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creating trusts.279 The duty of prudence is a broad duty through which the
general or specific management of the trust can be challenged. Thus, it
is foreseeable that an environmental justice plaintiff could bring a claim
alleging that the state, as trustee, has breached its duty of prudence.
2.

Duty of Impartiality

Because of the duty of impartiality, a trustee must balance the
competing interests of differently situated beneficiaries fairly and reasonably.280 Quite plainly, this duty forbids favoritism between classes of
beneficiaries.281 This duty is especially relevant in the environmental
resource management context because a trustee must balance the interest of current and future generations. As a result, in the environmental
context, this encourages states to be proactive in protecting the environment and its resources so the trust is being preserved for future beneficiaries as well.282 In environmental justice cases brought through the
public trust doctrine, this could bolster current beneficiaries’ claims
opposing a government’s action or decision.283
3.

Loyalty

Loyalty is often considered the fundamental duty of trust law.284
The duty of loyalty requires the trustee to exercise undivided loyalty to
the beneficiaries by placing their interests above his own.285 This duty is
meant to force the trustee to take actions with the beneficiaries’ interests
and needs in mind.286 Since this is a bedrock of trust law,287 the duty of loyalty is interpreted strictly by courts.288 The strict interpretation by courts
279
See PA CONST. art. I, § 27 (duty to “conserve and maintain” public natural resources);
see also John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45
ENV’T L. 463, 487 (2015).
280
See Duty of Impartiality, in LEWIS LAW OF TRUSTS, CALI, http://lewislawoftrusts.law
books.cali.org/chapter/duty-of-impartiality/ [https://perma.cc/2CCS-RMJZ] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2022).
281
See Trustee Duties and Liabilities, supra note 278.
282
WOOD, supra note 128, at 169.
283
See discussion infra Section V.C.
284
See Vincent R. Johnson, The Fiduciary Obligations of Public Officials, 9 ST. MARY’S
J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 300, 312 (2019).
285
Id.; see UNIF. TR. CODE § 232; FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 137, at 25–26.
286
John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 931 (2005).
287
See Johnson, supra note 284, at 312.
288
See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Justice Cardozo expressed
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is evident through the “no further inquiry” rule.289 According to this rule,
if a trustee engages in specified misconduct, courts will automatically find
that the trustee breached his duty of loyalty.290 When considering this duty
through a public trust lens, the state would owe loyalty to its citizens. If
a trustee, and its officials, were to use their office to favor industry to the
detriment of the beneficiaries, they would breach their duty of loyalty.
C.

Citizens Have Standing as Beneficiaries to Challenge the
Government’s Management of the Public Trust

To bring a legal claim, a plaintiff must possess standing.291 Thus,
environmental justice plaintiffs must also demonstrate standing to bring
a breach of fiduciary duty claim. This Section will explore potential issues
with standing, but ultimately conclude that beneficiaries would have
standing when states interpret the public trust through private trust law.292
One potential issue with standing could arise if the courts interpreted the public trust to be a discretionary trust. Some courts have been
keen to deny beneficiaries standing to pursue their breach claims under
a discretionary trust because they do not believe beneficiaries possess a
property interest.293 In such trusts, a beneficiary may only have a “mere
hope or probability of inheriting,” so the beneficiary lacks standing to
protect his interest until such a trust is distributed.294 Although this interpretation would prevent environmental justice plaintiffs from successfully bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim, this interpretation is not
the binding law.295 In fact, scholars and the Seventh Circuit have held
that such an interpretation would go against the key principle of trust law:
to empower beneficiaries to hold trustees responsible for their actions.296
Therefore, even if the trust is deemed discretionary, it is not a death
sentence for environmental justice claims because of the importance of
allowing beneficiaries to challenge trustees.297
that “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. . . .
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
under the rule of undivided loyalty.”).
289
See Alan Newman, Trust Law in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Fiduciary
Accountability, 29 QUINN. PROB. L.J. 261, 274 (2016).
290
Id.
291
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992).
292
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
293
See Newman, supra note 289, at 281–82.
294
Id.
295
Id. at 284–85.
296
Id.
297
Id.
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Another issue could arise if courts decide to interpret public trusts
like charitable trusts.298 In charitable trust law, beneficiaries do not have
the power to challenge the trustee; instead, the power is given to a public
official, like the attorney general, since beneficiaries’ interests are likely
uniform and too small to be privately enforceable.299 This poses a few issues. If charitable trust principles are imported to evaluate public trusts,
the citizens may lose standing.300 If citizens lose standing it’s unlikely that
the goals of environmental justice will be achieved because citizens would
have to appeal and convince a government official to challenge a government action. Thus, for environmental justice claims to succeed, it is critical
that courts evaluate public trusts using private trust law principles.301
If the courts interpret the public trust using private trust law,
then all beneficiaries who meet the typical elements of standing would
have standing to bring suit.302 An environmental justice plaintiff could
demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability.303 Thus, the
citizens—the beneficiaries—can and should be empowered to ensure that
the state—the trustee—is managing the environment and natural resources in the interest of its present and future citizens. The foundation
of trust law is the ability of beneficiaries to hold trustees accountable.304
Environmental justice plaintiffs will have standing, as beneficiary of the
public trust, to sue the state government for breaching its fiduciary duties
so long as the public trust is evaluated using private trust principles.305
D.

Elements of the Claim

After demonstrating standing, to succeed on a breach of fiduciary
duty claim and obtain relief, the plaintiffs will need to demonstrate: (1)
the existence of a trust and a fiduciary relationship; (2) breach of a fiduciary duty; (3) causation; and (4) harm.306
298

John Dernbach, The Role of Trust Law Principles in Defending Public Trust Duties for
Natural Resources, 54 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM, 77, 77 (2021).
299
FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 137, at 31.
300
Id. Citizens would lose standing to challenge a government’s decisions or actions that
could result in environmental injustice because the power to make such a challenge is
vested with the attorney general.
301
This is not an unprecedented interpretation. Pennsylvania evaluated its public trust
using private trust law principles. See discussion infra Part V.
302
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007).
303
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–63.
304
See Newman, supra note 289, at 261–62.
305
See discussion infra Section V.C.
306
See 4 Elements of Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim, GRIFFITHS LAW PC [hereinafter 4
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First, to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the state,
plaintiffs must prove that a trust and a fiduciary relationship exist.307
The plaintiffs can demonstrate that a trust exists by providing relevant
constitutional provisions and past court interpretations of such language.308
If there is a constitutional provision, plaintiffs can utilize the tools of
statutory interpretation (e.g., plain meaning, substantive cannons, and
legislative history) to argue that the constitutional provision creates an
enforceable public trust. Plaintiffs can identify what the res is, who the
trustee is, and who the beneficiaries are.309 Then, the plaintiffs need to
explain that, as a matter of law, a fiduciary relationship exists between
the state and the citizens.310 This element will be fairly easy to establish,
as many states have definitively held that a public trust exists,311 and
that it imposes duties and responsibilities on the state.312
Second, plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that the state breached
its fiduciary duties.313 Plaintiffs must show that the trustee—the state—
breached its duty (e.g., prudence, loyalty, or impartiality).314 Generally, a
breach occurs when a trustee fails to act in the best interests of the trust’s
beneficiaries.315 The exact manner of demonstrating will differ depending
on the nature of the relationship and the breach.316 Importantly, courts
would give less deference to a government agency in a breach of fiduciary
analysis than they would in a statutory interpretation issue.317
Elements of Breach], https://www.griffithslawpc.com/resources/elements-breach-fiduciary
-duty-claim/ [https://perma.cc/8RG5-AJUX] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
307
See supra notes 255–66 and accompanying text.
308
See supra notes 255–66 and accompanying text.
309
See supra notes 255–66 and accompanying text.
310
See supra Section III.A.
311
See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–3.
312
See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–3.
313
See Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Everything You Need to Know, KLENK LAW [hereinafter
Breach of Fiduciary Duty], https://www.klenklaw.com/practices/trust-and-estate-litiga
tion/breach-of-fiduciary-duty/ [https://perma.cc/LWS2-Y9HC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
314
See discussion supra Section IV.B.
315
See Nicole Haff, Understanding Breach Fiduciary Duties Claims, ROMANO LAW (Nov. 7,
2019), https://www.romanolaw.com/2019/11/07/understanding-breach-of-fiduciary-duties
-claims/ [https://perma.cc/B8LF-SZYA].
316
Adam Barone, What Are Some Examples of Fiduciary Duty?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 19,
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042915/what-are-some-examples-fidu
ciary-duty.asp [https://perma.cc/PMC7-T7VU]. For further discussion of how a plaintiff
can show breach of the various duties, see discussion infra Section V.C.
317
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation
in Governance, 39 ENV’T L. 91, 112–13 (2009).
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Third, a plaintiff needs to successfully show the court that they
suffered a harm as a result of the trustee’s misconduct. If there is no harm,
a plaintiff cannot succeed in a breach of a fiduciary duty claim.318 Thus,
plaintiffs need to identify the damages that resulted from the trustee’s
breach of duty.319 The more specific one can be with one’s calculation of
damages the better.320
Fourth, a plaintiff needs to show causation.321 A plaintiff must show
the court that the breach of the fiduciary duty caused the damages he or
she alleges in the claim.322 In order to show causation, the claimant will
need to demonstrate that the damages were a foreseeable result of the
breach of the fiduciary duty.323
E.

Remedies Available

There are a few remedies that would be available to environmental justice plaintiffs bringing a breach of fiduciary duties claim. First,
plaintiffs could seek declaratory relief.324 Declaratory relief is when a
court states “the rights of the parties without ordering any specific action
or listing awards for damages.”325 Declaratory relief would be a victory
for environmental justice since, in granting such relief, the court would
affirm that citizens are the beneficiaries of the public trust and that as
a result, the states have fiduciary duties.326 Despite the fact that it would
not result in compensatory damages, this potential remedy would create
better case law for future environmental justice plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs could seek injunctive relief as well. Injunctive relief
would postpone, temporarily revoke, or stop the cause of the injury until
further review can occur.327 This would stop the state from continuing to
breach its fiduciary duties.328 For environmental justice plaintiffs, this could
be very significant: it could halt the issuance of a permit, the development of a project, or the operations of a detrimental site or facility.
318

Haff, supra note 315.
Barone, supra note 316.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Haff, supra note 315.
325
Declaratory Relief, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/declaratory_re
lief [https://perma.cc/9S3Q-76M8] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
326
Wood, supra note 317, at 113.
327
Haff, supra note 315.
328
Id.
319
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In addition to declaratory relief, a court could issue an order to
the state, compelling the trustee to perform its duties.329 An order to
compel the trustee to perform its duties could mean that the government
must complete an additional review of the action at issue or that the state
must better consider environmental justice concerns in their decisionmaking processes.330
Also, restoration plans could be implemented as a result of the
breach.331 A court could require a restoration plan to recover the part of
the res that was harmed through the breach.332 The policy behind such
a remedy is to “return the beneficiaries to their rightful position.”333 This
is an interesting remedy because a court can give a government or its
agencies deference concerning the means of how to recover the asset while
clearly requiring the recovery.334 Mary Christina Wood, a preeminent
scholar in this field, explained that such a remedy is not unprecedented,
as it is used frequently in Endangered Species Act and zoning lawsuits.335
Furthermore, if a trustee benefited financially from its breach of
fiduciary duty, the court would likely order the trustee to relinquish
these gains.336 As an example, if the state sold a tract of land or mineral
rights, they could have to discharge those profits. Lastly, if a trustee
breaches their duty of loyalty, it is generally considered to be fraud, so
compensatory and punitive damages would be available.337
Clearly, there are a wide range of remedies available that could
advance the goals of environmental justice. There are a plethora of
remedies available to environmental justice plaintiffs bringing a breach
of fiduciary duty claim against a state. Importantly, the remedy can be
tailored to best meet the needs of the plaintiffs and specific circumstances
of the case at hand.
V.

PENNSYLVANIA AS A CASE EXEMPLAR

In this Section, the viability of using the modern public trust
doctrine to bring environmental justice claims will be evaluated using
329

Breach of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 313.
Id.
331
Wood, supra note 317, at 114.
332
Id.
333
WOOD, supra note 128, at 182.
334
Wood, supra note 317, at 114.
335
Id. at 115.
336
Paul Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 570, 570 (2013).
337
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1225 (1995).
330
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Pennsylvania as an example because it has a robust public trust doctrine.338 On May 18, 1971, Pennsylvania adopted its Environmental
Rights Amendment, which states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.339
Although the provision was adopted in 1971, the Environmental Rights
Amendment laid dormant for many years.340 However, new life was
breathed into the public trust doctrine in Pennsylvania with the Robinson
Township and Pennsylvania Environmental Defense cases.341 Today, it is
understood that Article I, Section 27 grants environmental rights to individuals and that Article I, Section 27 created a public trust to which
the citizens are the beneficiaries.342 This evolution is indicative of the
growth that could occur in any state, but specifically in those states
explored in this Note who possess a constitutional amendment and
supporting case law.
A.

The Revitalization of the Public Trust Doctrine: Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth

In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania interpreted Article I, Section 27 as having three distinct
purposes.343 The primary, overarching purpose and duty for the state is
to “conserve and maintain” the natural resources, the corpus of the trust.344
338

See generally Richard Rinaldi, Dormant for Decades, the Environmental Rights Amendment of Pennsylvania’s Constitution Recently Received a Spark of Life from Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth, 24 WIDENER L.J. 435 (2015).
339
See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also Craig, supra note 141, at 831.
340
See generally Rinaldi, supra note 338.
341
See discussion infra Sections V.A–B.
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Manahan, supra note 168, at 276.
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See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957 (Pa. 2013) (noting that “[a]s
trustee, the Commonwealth has a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, whether such degradation,
diminution, or depletion would occur through direct state action or indirectly.”).
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In doing so, the court adopted a broad interpretation of what constituted
natural resources.345 The court held that the second clause of Article I,
Section 27 created a public trust since it asserted common ownership of
the state’s public natural resources for people today and for future
generations.346 Thus, the beneficiaries of the trust are the people—both
those presently living and those to come.347
The court interpreted the third clause of Article I, Section 27 to
mean that the state must follow its fiduciary duties when administering
the public trust.348 As the trustee, Pennsylvania must manage the res of
the trust with prudence, loyalty, impartiality.349 Furthermore, “[t]he Commonwealth’s obligations as trustee to conserve and maintain the public
national resources for the benefit of the people, including generations yet
to come, create a right in the people to seek to enforce the obligations.”350
The court noted that the duty of impartiality requires the state to balance the interests of all beneficiaries.351 This includes balancing the
interests of present and future beneficiaries.352
Robinson Township also provides insight into standing under the
public trust doctrine because the plaintiffs included individuals, political
organizations, and municipalities.353 The court determined that all of the
parties had standing.354 The Supreme Court held that individuals possessed both a substantial and direct interest in the outcome of the litigation and that there was injury in fact since the legislation would affect
aesthetic and recreational values of an area in which they lived.355
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine in Pennsylvania Today

Article I, Section 27 and recent case law interpreting it has provided an actionable environmental rights amendment.356 The evaluation
345

“Natural resources” was interpreted to include “not only state-owned lands, waterways,
and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna.” Id. at 955.
346
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of the public trust through private trust law principles established a fiduciary relationship between the state and its citizens.357 The state’s
primary duty, included in Article I, Section 27, is to conserve and maintain the public natural resources.358 Although this duty does not prevent
any use of natural resources, it requires the state “to prevent and remedy
the degradation, diminution, or depletion of . . . natural resources.”359
Furthermore, state and local governments must adhere to private trust
law duties like loyalty, prudence, and impartiality.360
As explained earlier in this Note, many states recognize the public
trust doctrine, albeit to varying degrees.361 Pennsylvania provides a framework for how states can amend their constitution and how plaintiffs can
develop the public trust through strategic litigation. Also, the current
jurisprudence in Pennsylvania provides a guide for how plaintiffs can
advance environmental justice claims. Right now, it is possible for Pennsylvania’s citizens to challenge environmental injustice by bringing a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the state or its agencies. A plaintiff can argue that a government action—like a permit, regulation, or
law—disproportionately impacts minorities and low-income populations,
and thus constitutes a violation of the state’s fiduciary duties as trustee.
C.

Using Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif
to Illustrate an Environmental Justice Claim Based on the
Public Trust Doctrine

Armed with an understanding of the pitfalls of the EPC and the
Civil Rights Act, the history of the public trust doctrine, and the modern
public trust doctrine in a variety of states, it is apparent that there is a
better way for environmental justice plaintiffs to recover for past wrongs
and prevent future injustices. This Note explained how a public trust can
be interpreted to grant citizens with a private cause of action.362 It

theories that either the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights, or the government
has failed in its trustee obligations, or upon both theories, given that the two paradigms,
while serving different purposes . . . are also related and overlap to a significant degree.”).
357
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Amendment, 28 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 589, 599–60 (2016).
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proceeded to explore the mechanics of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and
current laws in Pennsylvania, to transform a proposed idea into a concrete
solution.363 This final Section provides an analysis of the concrete solution
using an environmental justice fact pattern.364 Since Pennsylvania’s constitutional and case law concerning public trust has been fully explored,
this Note will proceed to evaluate a potential claim using a famous
Pennsylvania environmental justice case—Chester Residents Concerned
for Quality Living v. Seif.365
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, the
residents of Chester, the plaintiffs, alleged that the state made Chester
the singular location to dump the waste of nearby affluent communities.366 The plaintiffs cited that Chester, despite being just one town and
one-twelfth of Chester County, was home to five waste facilities while the
rest of the county only had two waste facilities.367 Specifically, sixty percent
of the county’s waste facilities were located in Chester, a primarily Black
community.368 Furthermore, Chester made up only eight percent of the
population.369 Due to the great disparity, the residents of Chester believed
the state was racially discriminating against Chester.370
If the public trust doctrine existed in Pennsylvania at the time,
the Residents of Chester (“Residents”) could have brought a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against Pennsylvania and the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”). The Residents could have alleged that both
363

See supra Section IV.D; supra Part V.
Although the plaintiffs in Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif sued
using the Civil Rights Act, for the purposes of this Note, the facts of the case will be used
to frame the proposed form of litigation: citizens bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against the state and the relevant agency. See generally Chester Residents Concerned for
Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
365
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entities were violating minorities’ rights to a clean and healthy environment. As this Note suggests, the Residents could have brought a breach
of fiduciary duty claim and alleged that the state and DEP violated their
duties as trustee by preserving the environment, the trust, unequally.
The Residents would have standing as beneficiaries of the public
trust. Since Pennsylvania interprets the trust using private trust law,371
a court would recognize that the Residents possessed a property interest
in the natural resources of the state. Furthermore, they would meet the
traditional requirements of standing.372 The Residents have a concrete
injury because they would have increased exposure to harmful pollutants
and dirtier air.373 These permitting decisions had real health affects as
residents of Chester were more likely to develop cancer and were exposed
to higher levels of air pollution.374 Additionally, they could show causation because the permitting decision directly increased their exposure to
pollutants. Lastly, the injury is redressable because the court can overturn the state’s permit issuance and require the state to further consider
environmental justice concerns in its decision-making process.
Since the Residents would have standing, they could bring a
breach of fiduciary duty claim. As previously explained, they would have
to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of a fiduciary duty, an injury, and causation.375 In Pennsylvania, there is existing
case law supporting that Article I, Section 27 created a public trust of
which the state is trustee,376 so the Residents would not have to labor to
prove its existence. The Residents would need to prove that the state’s
decision concerning the res would cause harm.377 Although the Residents
may not be able to put a firm price on the amount of harm, they could
reasonably calculate the damages that would result from placing another
waste facility in Chester County. They could provide details of their own
health impairments or scientific studies about the medical harms of living
close to waste facilities.378 Additionally, the Residents could cite the previously described statistics to show the disparity in treatment between
371
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beneficiaries of the trust.379 Through this discussion, the Residents could
demonstrate to the court the value of clean air and the harm that results
from the government’s decision to grant a permit to a waste facility to
operate in Chester.
To succeed on their breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Residents
would need to show causation.380 In describing the harm they would
suffer from the operation of the additional waste facility, the Residents
would need to emphasize that the state is the cause of the harm. Although the waste facility would be the party emitting the harmful pollutants, the state and regulating agency caused the harm through their
decision to grant approval to the facility to operate. Thus, the permitting
decision and approvals are the cause of the Residents’ injury.
The most difficult element for the Residents to prove would be
that the state breached its fiduciary duties. In this case, the Residents
could claim that the state violated its duty of prudence by approving the
permit for the waste facility.381 The Residents could argue that the agency
improperly managed the trust by creating such a high concentration of
pollutants in an insular area. The Residents could also argue that the
state plainly failed to consider the disproportionate impacts of its decision.
While a state environmental agency should utilize neutral decision-making
processes,382 that does not mean it is proper for an agency to ignore the
disproportionate impacts on races from their environmental decisions.383
As trustee, DEP has an increased burden to review decisions about the
res of the trust, the environment, and natural resources carefully. Thus,
when there is a history of discrimination that created inequality, the state,
as trustee, could not continue to manage the trust “neutrally” when it
would still give more to some beneficiaries than others.
In addition, the Residents could argue that the state breached its
fiduciary duty by violating its duty of impartiality.384 While the public
trust doctrine doesn’t prevent pollution or the expenditure of natural
resources, it does require the trustee to preserve and maintain the environment and resources for future generations.385 Here, the Residents
could argue that by granting a permit to operate another waste facility
379
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in Chester, current inhabitants would suffer more than other beneficiaries
of the trust in Chester County. The Residents could argue that by putting so many waste facilities in one area,386 the area would have lingering
issues for years to come which would disproportionately affect the interests of current and future beneficiaries of the environmental trust.
Lastly, the Residents could argue that the state violated its duty
of loyalty.387 The Residents could argue that the state placed the interests
of industry above the interests of the beneficiaries by granting a permit to
operate in an already highly polluted area.388 In their claim, the Residents could emphasize their environmental rights under Article I, Section 27. The public trust doctrine of Pennsylvania bestows environmental
rights by granting “a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment”
and instructing the Commonwealth to “conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people.”389 Thus, the incalculable benefits and general interests of the beneficiaries should be the motivating factor behind
all government decisions regarding the environment.
As evident through this example, environmental justice plaintiffs
would not need to prove discriminatory intent to obtain a remedy
through a breach of fiduciary duty claim. This hypothetical application
illustrates how the public trust doctrine can be used to the benefit of
environmental justice plaintiffs. Pennsylvania is the model example, but
there are other states where such action is currently possible or will
likely be in the future. In summary, using the public trust doctrine to
advance environment justice is a viable course of action.
CONCLUSION
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”390 While
there is awareness about environmental justice and its goals, minorities
and low-income communities are still suffering from disproportionate
exposures to pollution and other environmental hazards.391 These communities are in need of an additional means of bringing environmental
386
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justice claims to assist them in obtaining meaningful results and furthering the goals of the movement. As the law stands, heavy burdens are
placed upon plaintiffs bringing suit through the EPC or the Civil Rights
Act.392 Both the EPC and the Civil Rights Act have proven to be unfit
tools through which to achieve change due to the requirement to show
discriminatory intent to succeed and obtain a remedy.393 Thus, it is imperative that a new legal avenue is paved to remedy discriminatory decisions
and prevent minorities and low income populations from being disproportionately subjected to harmful effects moving forward.
As John Dernbach eloquently expressed, “[t]o vindicate public
trusts for natural resources, environmental and natural resources lawyers need to become better trust lawyers.”394 States’ public trust doctrines
can provide environmental justice litigants with new hope. What once
was an antiquated and limited common law doctrine is now an expanding
and increasingly applicable legal doctrine.395 Over time, his doctrine has
been adopted across the United States through constitutional provisions
and common law.396 In its modern form, the public trust gives citizens a
right to a clean and healthy environment and places various duties upon
the states to preserve and maintain the environment.397 Thus, this Note
proposes that plaintiffs fight against environmental injustice in state
courts by alleging that a state, with an environmental public trust,
breached its fiduciary duties pursuant to the public trust doctrine. By
analyzing the public trust through private trust law, citizens are empowered to challenge the decisions or actions of the state. Citizens could sue
the state for breaching its fiduciary duties as trustee of the environment.398 If the state is found to have violated these duties, citizens—
including environmental justice plaintiffs—would be entitled to relief.399
Applying private trust law to determine how states should manage their environmental trusts is not an abstract or far-fetched concept,
but a new reality. Pennsylvania has already adopted such an interpretation.400 While Pennsylvania is at the forefront of this movement, the
structure necessary to create a broad, actionable public trust doctrine
392
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like Pennsylvania’s exists in several other states. As previously expressed,
there are several states with strong public trust constitutional provisions
or with a robust application of the doctrine based on case law;401 these
states have the foundation to expand the doctrine. Through strategic litigation, meaningful court decisions, and legislative action, the public trust
doctrine can continue to evolve and ultimately function as a tool for environmental justice advocates. By evaluating trust law through private trust
law concepts, environmental justice plaintiffs obtain a clear path, without
significant obstacles, to obtain relief and take a step toward true equality.

401
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